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MAGYARÁZAT:Konyv: A fonok beszede - Oszod utan tiz evvel
Főoldal Könyv Napjaink, bulvár, politika Magyar Mindennapi politika. A hangulat békés volt. Az eseménysort vagy az utcáról tudósítottam végig, vagy szerkesztőként dolgoztam a Hírszerző. Korábban nem hittem volna, hogy egy rendőrattakhoz is hozzá lehet szokni valamennyire, csak akkor Korábban nem hittem volna, hogy egy rendőrattakhoz is hozzá lehet szokni valamennyire, csak akkor döbbentem rá, hogy konyv: A fonok beszede - Oszod utan tiz evvel egyfajta közöny bennem a látottak iránt, amikor egy ismerősömmel egyik este elnéztünk a Parlamenthez, az Alkotmány utca felé, és éppen belefutottunk egybe.
Én szinte csak azt mérlegeltem, az egész megér-e annyit, hogy felhívjam az aznapi ügyeletes hírszerkesztőt, és megkérdezzem, van-e kint tudósítónk, vagy ha nincs, bediktáljak-e pár mondatot, de az ismerősöm teljesen megdöbbent. Ő akkor látott ilyet. Aztán akkor fogtam fel, mennyire abnormális, feszült légkörben éltünk mi abban az időben Budapesten, amikor pár nappal a helyhatósági választások előtt hazalátogattam a szüleimhez Gántra.
Úgy emlékszem, szinte szó szerint a fellélegzéshez hasonló érzés volt átélni a nyugalmat. A feszültség viszont, sokféle formában azóta is itt maradt velünk. Őszöd hatását már sosem tudjuk kiküszöbölni, rengeteg remek elemzés született a beszéd következményeiről. Én úgy gondoltam, érdekes lenne megkérdezni közéleti szereplőket, ők hogyan látják, mennyiben hat máig a beszéd, és a botrány, mennyiben lökte kényszerpályára az országot, mit hozott Orbán Viktor kétharmada, és mik várnak ránk egy folyamatosan átalakuló nem feltétlenül jó irányba haladó Európai Unióban.
Az itt olvasható vélemények számos ponton ellentmondanak egymásnak, azt hiszem, ez így természetes Utolsó ismert ár: 3 Ft. Válassza az Önhöz legközelebb eső átvételi pontot, és vegye át rendelését szállítási díj nélkül, akár egy nap alatt! Nincs értékelés. Ezek is érdekelhetik Kapcsolódó termékek. Még több a szerzőtől Kategória bestsellerei Kiadói újdonságok. Orbán Viktor, a káosz embere Kósa András.
Törzsvásárlóként: pont. Győzelmi kényszer Rényi Pál Dániel. Az Orbán-szabály G. Fodor Gábor. Showbusiness, Hungary Kordos Szabolcs. Maffiózók mackónadrágban Dezső András. A dörzsölt szélkakas Mérő László. Magyar kóla Dezső András. Teljes lista. A véradó krónikája Yu Hua. A posztkommunista rendszerek anatómiája Madlovics Bálint - Magyar Bálint. Az én hibám Szarka Károly. Darabjaim Galkó Balázs. Az ördög keresztje Nádasdy-Csontos Elek.
Államcsínytevők Vörös Imre. Kívánságlistához adom. Események
It is a collection of interviews with former and current politicians as well as with political commentators. A reader and friend of Hungarian Spectrum, Steven N. If yes, he would translate it for us. I gladly accepted his offer. Here is the first part of the interview. But first, a few words about András Kósa. I remember him from the time he was writing in the still liberal Magyar Hírlap in the early s. Later he worked for Hírszerző, which was eventually absorbed by HVG.
For a short while he wrote for vs. The website received some bad press recently when it became known that New Wave Media, the owner of vs. András Kósa was one of them. I know we will have a brisk discussion on this very controversial subject.
András Kósa: Ten years after these events occurred, are you still interested in how the speech was leaked in the end? Ferenc Gyurcsány: Not really. How konyv: A fonok beszede - Oszod utan tiz evvel did your tenure as prime minister and the leaking of the Őszöd speech affect Hungary over the past ten years?
Significantly, because of its consequences. First of all, it discredited a very important reform policy that I still feel is the right direction to go. We would be much further along today in many respects if we could carry out reforms in education, health care, and other areas. I can immodestly say that the Őszöd scandal gravely wounded a politician who certainly had within himself the possibility of attaining further success — me.
Individually as well as collectively, these are substantial developments in the life of the country. With greater wisdom and experience, I would have handled the situation that emerged after the elections differently. But those who did what they did with the speech, all the way from those who leaked it to how my opponents deliberately misinterpreted it, bear a grave, criminal responsibility. Interestingly, Fidesz brought up this topic again during the campaign.
It would have made sense then. Is this true? I can state with confidence that I and those I was in direct contact with in the government and in the MSZP leadership strongly believed in the possibility of victory.
Sárközy prepared a comprehensive proposal package for the reform of state administration. So we were ready to continue governing. Following the leaking of the speech in September and the first street disturbances, there was a vote of confidence in Parliament on October 6, that reaffirmed your role as Prime Minister. Was this not at all an issue for MSZP at that time? Were you supported uniformly? If there really was such an issue in the party, they did not give any indication of it.
If you had resigned in or and Fidesz had won early elections, then several commentators — for example, Gábor Török also discussed this with me — think you would have been able to triumphantly return to power even in Many people have subsequently said that there would have been much less controversy if Konyv: A fonok beszede - Oszod utan tiz evvel Gyurcsány had delivered this speech though not of course with these same words in Parliament, at a public event or in a televised speech.
Yes, many have said that. Yet the text that lies behind it is one of the best since the change of regime in And it had a different function than a public speech. The Őszöd speech was the way it was because I had to shake up a reluctant party that found it difficult to take action, so I chose passionate, exaggerated words for this situation. If I have to confront people in a public setting, then naturally I formulate my words differently, because that speech has yet another function.
The speech stands on its own even without the profanity. They built a campaign on this, which suggested that Viktor Orbán and his party knew about the speech well before its disclosure to the public. We are almost certain of this, and we essentially know that Viktor Orbán, as the head of Fidesz, was informed very early about the speech, and that he knew exactly when and how it would be leaked.
And we also know that Fidesz played a key role in preparing the ground for the disturbances that followed the leaking of the speech. Was Fidesz in contact with groups of football hooligans, or extreme right-wing elements that took to the streets and besieged the television headquarters, for example?
I can say this about it: I now know that there is a paper in the Hungarian public administration that describes this factually and is classified as a state secret. From these reports, it became perfectly clear that leaders from the upper-upper-uppermost level of Fidesz were involved in this process.
Did you try in any way — informally — to confront them with this? Investigations by the state security services at that time revealed that mid-level Fidesz leaders had also organized the disturbances. So this brings us to the autumn of The breaching of the cordon in February and the completely passive behavior of the police made it clear to all, even to laymen, how uncertain the entire state apparatus and even the legitimate bodies of violence were with respect to the government.
What was your sense of this? This is what we felt, of course. The konyv: A fonok beszede - Oszod utan tiz evvel felt then that the left wing, which exactly 15 years earlier had passed through the eye of the needle and turned from a dictatorial state party into a democratic political force, was itself also very uncertain about whether or not it could use the powers of law enforcement, and if so, then for how long and to what extent it could use them. This uncertainty has been throughout our entire culture.
The police themselves were also uncertain. Of course, it not only about them, as there were legal proceedings that resulted from breaching the cordon. In your own criminal case, what did you feel was the attitude of those who represented the administration of justice? They wanted to charge me with many things, but altogether they only dared to accuse me of one. In this one case I was informed that Chief Prosecutor Péter Polt was constantly informed of the state of the proceedings, while he informed Viktor Orbán, and the Konyv: A fonok beszede - Oszod utan tiz evvel Minister constantly had an opinion about what should be done.
I was also informed that there was considerable pressure on the prosecuting attorneys, and that enormous pressure had been placed on suspects in other cases to get them to cut an informal immunity deal and testify against me to have their charges dropped or reduced.
It was about whom also spoke publicly. I was likewise informed that at the end of my case the so-called Sukoró casethe prosecutor wished to terminate the proceedings due to the absence of criminal activity, and at the instructions of his superiors had to rewrite this to the absence of proof.
But the absence of proof for the suspicion in question was practically conceptual nonsense. They accused me of abuse of official authority. But if this was the accusation, then they had to be able to show factually where I abused my authority. To this day, people in Hungary still recall your debate with Viktor Orbán for the candidacy of prime minister in the spring ofwhich was viewed as a clear victory for you over the Fidesz chairman according to most commentators.
Afterwards, you also had meetings with Orbán as prime minister. How did you view him subsequent to that? If he had become prime minister sooner, perhaps he would not have acted so ruthlessly against the left wing. But even after the Fidesz defeat in that surprised everyone, there were statements about how they needed to learn from this failure, and that they had to be even harder on the opposition next time.
How can you explain that even after eight years in the opposition, Fidesz was able to continuously build up its own media and create a base of support, while the left, after eight years of governing, now finds itself bled dry, and in a very difficult situation? What do you think the reason for this is? There are several reasons for this. Its internal cohesion and capacity to withstand stresses are even now significantly stronger than those of its rivals.
InI made a kind of analytical statement to the effect that Orbán was constructing a shadow "konyv: A fonok beszede - Oszod utan tiz evvel," and so would be able to hold on to positions of power even in opposition, which was unusual not only for a Western-style democracy, but also for Hungary.
This also demonstrates the capabilities of this camp and of course their lack of inhibition as well. For us in the opposition, poverty mostly characterized us. So while these three factors have undoubtedly been a success from the point of view of Orbán and Fidesz, in terms of the fate and future of the country, many negative lessons have rather been associated with them.
Many certainly thought about it. For me, there are some things in politics that will never be venial sins, such as corruption. Along with others, it also appears likely to me that parties who were large during the regime change had a background full of murky financial affairs. This had the consequence that I sponsored a new bill on party financing in — and Fidesz thwarted it. Yet it seemed that Hungarian politics would have a moment of grace, and that the parties would be able to agree with each other on a very important issue.
Fidesz initialed the draft law. Following the discussions, I was informed by the Parliamentary delegations that it would soon pass through Parliament. For him, things are fine the way they are now. There have been all sorts of theories, even conspiracy theories, about which political side is responsible for this, and may have provided support for it. To what extent was the political crisis that arose in the wake of the Őszöd speech the breeding ground for this development, as you see it?
There are many reasons for this, but I do not want to hunt for responsibility in anyone else. We, and I myself, did not have a quite accurate feel at the time for the kinds of consequences, in part socially and in part psychologically, that would accompany the austerity policy that we continued from autumn for another year and a half or two years, or for its capability of radicalizing certain groups of the electorate.
In this sense, we did have something to do with voters migrating to the Jobbik camp from both the left and right wings alike. All other statements about us deliberately and consciously looking for ways to build up such a camp belong to the world of conspiracy theories. What do you think the cause of this crisis is? The Hungarian left lacks people with personalities. The great age group, which played a key role and a progressive role during the time of the regime change and had Gyula Horn as its leader, has reached its end of life, and the next generation has basically found Fidesz as its own party.
The other phenomenon is more complex, and global in nature. We see its manifestations in the U. Those in this new generation have arrived at the beginning of their adult lives unable to enjoy things now that previously seemed almost natural a relatively good job at some point, with relatively good pay, an apartment that is relatively easy to acquire.
This is the real reason behind this radicalization.